A forthcoming article in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, "Pirational Choice: The Economics of Infamous Pirate Practices," looks at the economics of pirate practices. A pdf is available on the author's web site.
Abstract:
This paper investigates the economics of infamous pirate practices. Two closely related economic theories—the theory of signaling and the theory of reputation building—explain these practices. First, I examine the pirate flag, “Jolly Roger,” which pirates used to signal their identity as unconstrained outlaws, enabling them to take prizes with out costly conflict. Second, I consider how pirates combined heinous torture, public displays of “madness,” and published advertisement of their friendishness to establish a reputation that prevented costly captive behaviors. Pirates’ infamous practices reduced their criminal enterprise’s costs and increased its revenues, enhancing the profitability of life “on the account”.
HT: Eric Barker and the Barking up the wrong tree blog
No comments:
Post a Comment